Abstract-The problem of symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR) from a coded database which is distributively stored among colluding servers is studied. Specifically, the database comprises K files, which are stored among N servers using an (N, M )-MDS storage code. A user wants to retrieve one file from the database by communicating with the N servers, without revealing the identity of the desired file to any server. Furthermore, the user shall learn nothing about the other K − 1 files in the database. In the T -colluding SPIR problem (hence called TSPIR), any T out of N servers may collude, that is, they may communicate their interactions with the user to guess the identity of the requested file. We show that for linear schemes, the information-theoretic capacity of the MDS-TSPIR problem, defined as the maximum number of information bits of the desired file retrieved per downloaded bit, equals 1 −
I. INTRODUCTION
The situation where a user wants to retrieve a file from a database without revealing the identity of the requested file is known as the problem of private information retrieval (PIR). It is shown that if the database is stored at a single server, the only possible scheme for the user is to download the entire database to guarantee information-theoretic privacy [1] , [2] , which is inefficient in practice. It is further shown that the communication cost can be reduced in sublinear scale by replicating the database at multiple non-colluding servers [2] . To further protect the privacy of the database, symmetric private information retrieval (SPIR) is introduced [3] , such that the user obtains no more information regarding the database other than the requested file. In [1] - [3] , the database is modeled as a bit string, and the user wishes to retrieve a single bit. In these works, the communication cost is measured as the sum of the transmission at the querying phase from user to servers and at the downloading phase from servers to user.
When the file size is significantly large and the target is to minimize the communication cost of only the downloading phase, a series of recent works derives information-theoretic limits of various versions of the PIR problem [4] - [8] etc. The metric of the downloading cost is defined as the number of bits downloaded per bit of the retrieved file, and the reciprocal of which is named the PIR capacity. In subsequent works by Sun and Jafar [4] - [6] , the PIR capacity with duplicated databases, duplicated databases with colluding servers, SPIR with duplicated (non-colluding) databases are derived.
Considering another cost in storage systems, i.e. storage overhead, a series of works studies schemes and information limits for various PIR problems with coded databases [7] - [13] . In [9] , PIR is achieved by downloading one extra bit other than the desired file, given that the number of storage nodes grows with file size, which can be impractical in some storage systems. In [10] , storage overhead can be reduced by increasing the number of storage nodes. In [11] , tradeoff between storage cost and downloading cost is analyzed. Subsequently in [12] , explicit schemes which match the tradeoff in [11] are presented. It is worth noting that in the recent work of [7] , the capacity of PIR for coded database is settled, which improves the results in [11] , [12] . In our recent work [8] , the capacity of SPIR for coded database is derived. More recently in [13] , the authors present a framework for PIR from coded database with colluding servers. In this work, we generalize our previous work [8] on SPIR for MDS-coded database to the case with T -colluding servers, hence called MDS-TSPIR. In analogy to previous works on SPIR [6] , [8] , in the non-trivial context where the database comprises at least two files, storage nodes need to share common randomness which is independent to the database and meanwhile unavailable to the user. In particular, we derive the capacity of linear SPIR for an (N, M )-MDS coded database where any T servers may collude. We also derive a lower bound on the amount of common randomness needed to assure nonzero capacity. We conjecture that our result holds for general MDS-TSPIR schemes, which would reduce to our previous result in [8] for non-colluding servers with T = 1, and the result in [6] for replicated non-colluding databases with T = 1 and M = 1. 
II. MODEL

A. Notations
User queries: A user wants to retrieve a file W κ from the database, where the desired file index κ is drawn from
The MDS storage code is known to the user. In addition to this, the user has no knowledge of the stored data. Let U denote a random variable privately generated by the user, which represents the randomness of the query scheme followed by the user. The random variable U is independent of the database and the desired file index. Based on the realization of the desired file index k and the realization of U, the user generates and sends queries to all nodes, where the query received by node-n is denoted by Q
K] denote the complete query scheme, namely, the collection of all queries under all cases of desired file index. We have that H(Q|U ) = 0. Node common randomness: Let random variable S denote the common randomness shared by all nodes, the realization of which is known to all nodes but unavailable to the user. The common randomness is utilized to protect database-privacy (2) below. For any node n ∈ [1 : N ], a random variable S n is generated from S, which is used in the answer scheme followed by node n. Hence, H(S 1 , . . . , S n |S) = 0. Node answers: Based on the query Q [k] n , the stored data D n , and the random variable S n generated from the common randomness, each node sends an answer A [k] n to the user. Specifically for the linear schemes discussed in this work, the answers are generated by taking the inner product of the query and stored data, then plus the random variable S n used by the node, i.e. A
[1:N ] and the query scheme Q, the user shall be able to decode the requested file W k with zero error. Any set of T nodes may collude to guess the requested file index, by communicating their interactions with the user. Two privacy constraints must be satisfied:
• User-privacy: any T colluding nodes shall not be able to obtain any information regarding the identity of the requested file, i.e.,
(1) • Database-privacy: the user shall learn no information regarding other files in the database, that is, defining
We use the same definition as in [8] for rate and capacity of T -private SPIR schemes. 
Definition 1. The rate of a T -private SPIR scheme is the number of information bits of the requested file retrieved per downloaded answer bit.By symmetry among all files, for any
.
When there is only one file in the database, the two privacy constraints become trivial. When K ≥ 2, T -private SPIR is non-trivial and our main result is summarized below. 
otherwise .
III. CONVERSE
In this section, we show the converse part of Theorem 1. In the problem setup, there is no privacy constraint on the common randomness S. However, we argue that for optimal schemes, the user shall not be able to obtain any information about S. Details of the argument are in the long version [14] . The intuition is that if the user can obtain some information about S, that part of information cannot be used for randomizing the distribution of Wk for database-privacy. In this section for the converse we look for the lowest upper bound of the rate, we require that the user learns no information about S.
Lemma 2. For any set of nodes
where (a) holds because the answers are deterministic functions of the database, common randomness, and the queries. In the last step, I(W [1:K] , S; Q) = 0 holds because the queries do not depend on the database and common randomness. On the other hand, it is immediate that I(A
In Lemma 3 below, we show that for any optimal linear scheme, the entropy of the answers from any set of M + T − 1 nodes are symmetric among all file indexes. 
T ). Hence, we have that
For an (N, M )-MDS storage code, the data stored at any set of M nodes are linearly independent. Furthermore, because the files in the database are statistically independent, the data stored at any M nodes are also statistically independent. (See Lemma 1 in [5] and Lemma 2 in [7] for a proof.) For any node n, the answer A [k] n is a deterministic function of the query Q [k] n , the stored data D n , and the random variable S n generated from the shared common randomness. In [8] , we show that given the queries of M nodes Q Fix a set of T nodes, by user-privacy we can neglect the file index in the queries and answers. We argue that for optimal schemes, (5) does not hold, the user can at least do not download from one node, which neither affects the privacy constraints, nor affects the information the user obtains. To conclude,
The proof of (4) is similar as that of (3). More details of the proof of the lemma and examples can be found in the long version [14] . 
Proof: By database-privacy (2), I(Wk
, where equality (a) holds because W k is independent of the queries, and equality (b) follows by (4) in Lemma 3. 
Theorem 5. The rate of any linear T -private SPIR scheme for an (N, M )-MDS coded database is bounded from above by
where (a) holds because the user should be able to decode W k from A 
By Han's inequality [15] , 
Proof: Let N be any set of M + T − 1 nodes, by databaseprivacy (2) and that W k is independent of other files Wk,
where equalities (a) follows from Lemmas 2-4.
Averaging over all N , and from the proof of Theorem 5,
IV. ACHIEVABILITY In this section, we present a scheme which achieves the capacity with the lowest secrecy rate in Theorem 1. The storage code is an (N, M )-MDS code. To achieve T -privacy, we generate queries by using an (N, T )-MDS code. The answers generated in this setting are codewords from the Schur-product of the storage code and query generating code. From [16] , the minimum dimension of the Schur product of the two MDS codes is M +T −1 (if M +T −1 ≤ N ), achieved when the two MDS codes are generalized Reed Solomon codes with the same evaluation-point sequence. Indeed, the scheme in [13] for PIR with coded colluding databases uses generalized Reed Solomon codes. Our scheme develops that in [13] to guarantee database-privacy.
be the file length, and let matrix W below represent all K files,
where every N −M −T +1 rows correspond to a file.
q where φ i = 0. The generating matrix of the storage code is
The data stored at the N nodes are generated by 
The user queries M rounds. For each round r, r ∈ [1 : M ], the user generates T independent uniformly random vectors U
T ] = U (r) , the N random vectors corresponding to each node are generated by
W.l.o.g, assume the desired file is W 1 . The detailed query scheme is presented in two orthogonal cases as follows. Table I , where E n denotes the nth column of E. The queries are generated by randomizing E in the same way as in (6) .
For each node n, the query Q
